

Introduction

*Understanding the State
Transformation*

In 1971, in the eastern province of Pakistan, a movement for political autonomy turned into a secessionist movement after the Pakistani military cracked down on the ethnic Bengali community, the majority population of the country. After nine months of war, millions of deaths, the rapes of hundreds of thousands of women, and the displacement of more than ten million people, a nation-state emerged: Bangladesh. Born out of the first successful secessionist movement since the Second World War in a land ravaged by the war and impoverished by lack of resources, the Bangladeshi state began its journey with high ideals—the ideals of egalitarianism, of secularism, and of democracy. The emergence of the state brought to power the social classes who had been politically marginalized within the Pakistani polity and kindled hope for an ethnic group subjected to economic marginalization for almost a quarter of a century; but it also sounded warning bells for the institutions of the world capitalist system, and the United States.

The regime began implementing some of these ideals of social-democratic secularism, but before long had reneged on its promises. The ideals of egalitarianism, described as socialism in the constitution, gave way before the demands of private entrepreneurship; the mode of governance drifted toward authoritarianism at the expense of democracy, and religious idiom soon found its way back to the political discourse undermining the principles of secularism. Three and a half years after independence came the most dramatic event: the military intervened in politics killing the founding leaders of the nation. This was the beginning of the final act of the transformation of the state. The process continued in various forms under different military rulers until 1990, when a popular uprising ousted the extant military regime. It was described as “the second liberation” by the popular press. The events rekindled hope and raised the possibility of change in the Bangladeshi polity. But the Bangladeshi state had by then become deeply integrated within the international economic system and was being ruled by a new alliance of classes. The civilian regimes have since alternated between two major political parties and have maintained the status quo. The transformation looks to be irreversible. There is no going back.

The present book is about this transformation process—the spectacular unfolding of a state. It is an account of how and why the Bangladeshi

state changed to an “administrative state” dominated by a nascent bourgeoisie, bureaucrats, and the military from an “intermediate state” dominated by the middle classes. Obvious questions are: what prompted the transformation? And, how has the state been transformed?

This book is also about the state in peripheral societies: an investigation into the formation and transformation processes of states—questions largely ignored by existing theories of the state. Although the book is empirical in nature and focuses on one country, it has conceptual implications that may contribute to the debate on the state in general and particularly on state capitalism, class formation in developing societies, the state-society relationship, and the intricate relationship between exogenous and endogenous factors in effecting social change. Discussions on the state abound in the fields of political theory and international relations, but they have largely focused on the advanced capitalist state rather than on states in peripheral societies, because “those engaged in the debate are trained almost exclusively on the advanced industrialized economies” (Phillips 2004:14). This is not to say that there has not been any deliberation on third world states, but these have been largely in the context of development.

One can find three representations of third world states in social science discourse: the first is in the context of globalization wherein third world states are considered in decline under the pervasive powers of globalization (Strange 1995), a dying breed making their last gasp. The second representation centers on governance issues, or more specifically on the “governance problem.” Capacity, or the lack of capacity, of the state in the third world is the “problem” and therefore begs a solution, and it is the effort to find the right prescription to “fix” the problem that drives this strand. The third approach looks at the state in relation to society and attempts to analyze their relationship. Within this third strand one can find acknowledgements of how the state in peripheral societies demands closer scrutiny, as an institution, as an actor, and as an arena of conflict of contending forces. But this strand remains weak to date, and on the margin of discussions on the state *per se*. Mindful of this lacuna, the present book attempts to insert the peripheral state into the debate. It raises two fundamental questions: what determines the nature of the state? And, how does the nature of the state change?

Through an examination of the Bangladeshi state, characterized by its historical specificity (i.e., post-colonial) and its position within the global capitalist system (i.e., peripheral), this book intends to demonstrate that domestic imperatives and external compulsions play pivotal roles while structural and conjunctural factors facilitate the transformation process. An analysis of the causes of, and conditions for, the meteoric rise and dramatic fall of an “intermediate state” in Bangladesh will help us understand the complexity of the phenomenon and various modes of interactions of state and social classes. I also intend to show how the global capitalist system influences the formation and transformation processes of the state in societies located on the periphery.

The objective of this book is, therefore, two-fold: first, it seeks to offer an alternative framework of analysis for understanding the state in post-colonial/peripheral societies; and, secondly, it strives to combine theoretical analysis with a macro-level case study. To achieve the first objective, a reexamination and revision of some fundamental theoretical categories such as the state and class is required. This is because “the study of capitalism outside the advanced industrialized democracies need[s] to dispense with restrictive assumptions about the nature of the states, classes, labor, and so on, and [seek] to understand the articulation of capitalist development in systems not characterized by the institutional and societal attributes found in the customary models” (Phillips 2004:15). The second objective is dealt with using a historical-structural approach that attempts to “disclose ‘deep structures’ which underline and produce directly observable phenomena of social life” (Bottomore 1983:471) and emphasize the historical transformation of structures by conflicts, movements, class struggles, and individuals.

I am well aware that terminology such as “periphery” is not in vogue, especially at a time when “globalization” has become such a buzz word. As such, some readers may find the use of “peripheral” in identifying the location of the Bangladeshi state within the global system uncomfortable and may feel that it gestures toward a certain structural, already assigned location of Bangladesh in the global political economy. Yet, it is my contention, notwithstanding the limitations of the term, that its analytical value cannot be undermined. Those countries that are not

members of the advanced capitalist community and did not belong to the socialist bloc are referred to by various titles, such as “developing,” “less-developed,” “underdeveloped,” “Global South,” and so on. Although these titles have some validity, they are obviously identified with an ideological position and are often misleading (for example, “the Global South,” even though one cannot discount that at least three major “developed” countries are also geographically located in the Southern Hemisphere). Additionally, the principal weakness of these concepts is their vagueness in terms of the relations of production and exchange that characterize these countries. The concept of “peripheral formations” used by world-system analysts like Samir Amin and Immanuel Wallerstein cannot claim to be completely free from such limitations, yet, in my view, are more successful in helping us understand the production relations of the countries in question better than other terms.

In the context of this book, the concept of the periphery is interpreted within the Marxian reproduction scheme. In the classical reproduction scheme, production is divided between two departments: the means of production (Department I) and the means of reproduction of the labor force (Department II). The former refers to the capital goods and joint inputs that are used by both Departments, while the latter refers to wage goods and wage services for the workers employed in them. In the case of a peripheral economy, Department I is either absent or incomplete. Thus, peripheral formations are characterized by disarticulation between economic sectors. Additionally, the full circuit of capital cannot take place within the countries themselves. The concept of a peripheral formation also refers to a particular structure of unequal relationships on a global scale, which emerged as a result of a process lasting some four centuries. The “capitalist world-system” that had emerged in an almost complete form by 1914, and has continued to develop since then, “integrated” a large number of countries within the capitalist system in the name of “developmentalist” ideology and produced the conditions now commonly termed “underdevelopment.” The need of Western capitalism to expand the scale of its accumulation and the continuation of that accumulation changed the patterns of class formation, class relations, and forms of state in the peripheral societies.

While the Bangladeshi state is characterized by its peripheral position within the global capitalist system, its historical specificity—post-coloniality—has its mark all over state formation processes. Therefore, understanding state transformation demands that we contemplate and analyze both of these elements.

My aim in this chapter is to introduce the central concepts or, in other words, the building blocs of the proposed analytical framework, followed by the details of the framework. In the final section, I provide a summary of my arguments, which are elaborated throughout the book with historical evidence and empirical precision, in the context of Bangladesh.

The Building Blocs

State-formation, interchangeable with “state-building” and “state-making,” is commonly understood to be the processes that lead to the centralization of political power over a well-defined territory, and with a monopoly of the means of coercion. Studies that identify the main elements of these processes can be grouped into four strands: capitalist dynamics and class conflict explanations, statist explanations, world system analyses, and geopolitical analyses. The first two strands emphasize internal factors, while the latter two highlight external factors, as the driving forces behind state formation processes. The logic of, and contradictions in, productive systems and economic modes of production within the state are seen as key elements by the capitalist dynamics and class conflict explanations. The statist explanations focus on consequences of events within the state such as governability crises. The world system analyses, on the contrary, examine the logic of the capitalist world economy and the place of the state within that world economy. The geopolitical analyses insist that interstate forces have a determining influence on state formation processes (Schwarz 2004:3). These explanations, especially their differences in focus, not only reflect what Colin Hay (2002:257) has called “disciplinary parochialism,” between International Political Economy (IPE) and Comparative Political Economy (CPE), but also show a false dichotomy between exogenous and endogenous factors. Understanding state formation processes in peripheral

societies requires us to dispense with this false dichotomy. What is essential is engagement with, and deployment of, conceptual frameworks from both strands, and a meshing of their perspectives and approaches.

The available literature on state formation is fraught with another problem that we need to be aware of and address at the outset. Barnett (2002:105) has alluded to this as an inclination toward “mono-causality”; that is to say, the frameworks of earlier studies have attempted to find *a* modal process, *a* master variable. This tendency has resulted in understanding the development of the modern nation state as a linear, step-wise process with a clearly identifiable end. But history has shown us that “there are many paths towards state formation” (Barnett 2002:105). And, of course, there is no finality to the process—the state remains open to potential changes all the time.

These shortcomings make it imperative that we choose a different point of departure and conceptualize the building blocs differently in order to understand state formation processes. The key concepts around which this study is built are intermediate classes, hegemony, and the relative autonomy of the state. These concepts and categories are used throughout the study to explain different social conditions and phenomena. I have no intention of providing any final definitions of these concepts, because of their essentially contested nature, but in this section I will simply furnish the meaning as imparted in this study.

Intermediate Classes

The notion of “intermediate class” was advanced by Gramsci (1979)¹ and later developed by Kalecki (1972) in a general way as being relevant to many developing countries. In the Indian context, K. N. Raj (1973:1191) saw it as the most appropriate category for explaining Indian politics while Namboodripad (1973) and Byers (1996) fiercely contested the notion, especially its appropriateness. According to Gramsci, peripheral countries are comprised of a broad spectrum of classes between the polar classes (i.e., proletariat and the bourgeoisie). Kalecki (1972) suggests that rich peasants, petty traders and businessmen, urban professionals and intellectuals all belong to an intermediate class and share some common aspirations.

Ahmad, who explored the idea of intermediate classes further, defined them as follows:

Small landowners, rich and middle peasants, the merchants of rural and semi-rural townships, small-scale manufacturers, retailers, and so on, are included here among the intermediate and auxiliary classes. The professional petty bourgeoisie has arisen mainly from these classes and shares many of the same interests and attitudes (Ahmad 1985:44).

Ahmad also argues that these intermediate classes have their own political projects and that they tend to establish their dominance over the state apparatuses, as well as over the proletariat and propertied classes.

Although this study will employ the description provided by Ahmad, it is necessary to keep in mind two important points. Firstly, in this study class is understood as a relational category, i.e., classes are determined by their relationship to one another within a system of social production. Secondly, the Marxian presupposition that each society has two fundamental classes is misleading for peripheral societies and should be avoided.

What I am suggesting with the first point is that social relations of production are the key to understanding class. Here, social relations of production primarily refer to (1) the relation to the means or forces of production, and (2) the form of surplus product (value) appropriation. These two elements essentially form the material basis of class and define, very broadly, class interests. Given that class is a historically contingent entity, the specific historical situation of the society needs to be considered while contemporary class formations and class relations are discussed.

The second point indicates that the concept of class is based on the understanding that in a given society at a given time some classes have a disproportionate share of assets (ranging from income to wealth and social status) than other social classes, and there exists a hierarchy among these classes. According to a Marxist interpretation, in a capitalist social formation one social class establishes its control over the means of production and by virtue of its economic position dominates and controls all aspects of

social life. This class is referred to as the “dominant class.” The “dominant class” is, therefore, the class that has a disproportionate share of economic and political power and, hence, much freer access to the state and an ability to direct the rules of the power game in its favor. The Marxist notion of class always suggests that in each mode of production there are two fundamental classes—the class of exploited producers and the exploiting classes. Thus, in a capitalist society there exist two fundamental classes: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. This oversimplified and bipolar division of social classes may have some relevance to mature and advanced capitalist societies, but it has not proved very useful in understanding peripheral societies. As Roxborough (1982) noted, referring to the Third World in general, “the class structures of the Third World differ from those of the advanced nations in two principal ways: they are more complex, and classes themselves are usually much weaker.” Furthermore, “not only are the class structures of the underdeveloped nations complex and weak, they are frequently ‘incomplete’ [sic] in the sense that the dominant class, or one fraction of the dominant class, is absent” (Roxborough 1982:72-73). The Marxian notion of a dominant class is problematic and misleading in peripheral societies as it implies a direct relationship between the state apparatus and a specific class. In the capitalist periphery, where historical origins and the formation of the state and social classes are different, the relationship of the social classes is more nuanced and mediated by a power bloc, which gives a particular shape to the relationship. It is in this context that the term “dominant class” is avoided in the present study and the term “prominent classes” is used to describe the classes that appear as important and significant in the capitalist periphery. Thus, the term refers to the class or classes who have gained prominence in politics, with or without the economic leverage commonly associated with a dominant class.

Hegemony

The term “hegemony” is used according to its Gramscian connotations. As defined by Gramsci, it is characterized by “the ‘spontaneous’ consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; the consent is ‘historically’

caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production” (Gramsci 1971:12). The question of hegemony, however, is not merely material, it is also a politics of moral and intellectual leadership. To assert its hegemony, the ruling class must be able to defend its own corporate interests by universalizing them, by ensuring that these interests can at least apparently “become the interests of the...subordinate groups” (Gramsci 1971:181). To this extent, hegemony implies consent rather than domination, integration rather than exclusion, and co-optation rather than suppression.

From this point of view, a ruling class is hegemonic when it establishes both material dominance and intellectual and moral leadership over society and when it succeeds in persuading subaltern classes that positions of subordination and superordination are just, proper, and legitimate. This requires that the ruling class be prepared to make certain concessions, which, while not fundamental, contribute to the political co-optation of popular sectors and the progressive expansion of the productive process. In this instance, as Gramsci points out, the ruling class “really cause(s) the entire society to move forward, not merely satisfying its own existential requirements, but continuously augmenting its cadres for the conquest of ever new spheres of economic and productive activity” (Gramsci 1971:60). This is the moment of “historic unity,” when the ruling class has established its material, ethical, and political leadership over society and when relationships of superordination and subordination are accepted by all as organic and not contradictory, as legitimate and not exploitative. When such a situation crystallizes, the ruling class achieves what might be called *paradigmatic hegemony*.

Relative Autonomy of the State

As the debate on “state failures” in developing countries gained salience since the early 1990s, the issue of state formation and the transformation of state forms came to the forefront in various social science disciplines. This is, in some ways, a reincarnation of the debate in the 1970s when discussions about the capitalist state proliferated. One of the most significant

consequences of that debate was the recognition of the omnipresence of the state in our lives. Evans (1995:5) succinctly describes this realization:

From the poorest countries of the Third World to the most advanced exemplars of welfare capitalism, one of the few universals in the history of the twentieth century is the increasingly pervasive influence of the state as an institution and social actor.

However, the concept of the state is one of the most problematic in politics. It has been variously conceptualized. These conceptualizations are based upon some combinations of its functions, purposes, activities, personnel, organizational contours, legitimacy, legal norms, rules and machinery, sovereignty, coercive monopoly, and territorial control. Thus, any definition of the relative autonomy of the state demands a clarification of our understanding of it and a review of state theories, especially Marxist theories of the state.

In this study, the concept of “state” is meant to convey a differentiated set of institutions and personnel which have a legitimate monopoly on authoritative rule-making, backed up by a monopoly on the means of physical violence, within a territorially demarcated area (Mann 1986:112; Rueschmeyer and Evans 1985:45-6). The concept implicitly incorporates three aspects of the state: apparatus, power, and authority. State apparatus, in this context, means the complex set of institutions staffed by a professional bureaucracy and armed forces, specialized to some degree or other, which together ensure the formulation and execution of policies. Secondly, the state represents a concentration of economic and political power. In most cases, it is the biggest single such concentration in a particular social formation. Thirdly, it also represents a concentration of authority. Which means, in the ideological sense, it is able to give legitimacy to the actions of those who act in its name, or at least claims such.

In terms of the constitutive elements of the state, we can broadly group them into three sets: the regime (mostly armed with legislative power, and having limited capacity for implementation); the executives (or, in other words, the bureaucracy and attendant organizations which have immense control over the implementation process); and the military (along

with other paramilitary forces that have a monopoly over legitimate coercion).

However, the state, be it in the periphery or in an advanced capitalist society, should not be viewed as only the conglomeration of these elements. Rather, it should be understood as the balance between them. At a given moment of time and in a given social formation, it is the relationship and balance between these elements that determines the nature of state. The other equally important aspect is the relationship between these institutions and the society where it is located.

It is in the context of this relationship between the constitutive elements of the state and between the state and society that the concept of relative autonomy of the state emerged. It owes a great deal to Marxist and neo-Marxist theories of the state. The primary view of the state reflected in the general theory of politics in Marx's writings asserts that the form and functions of the state reflect, and are largely determined by, the economic base of the society. Given that the ownership of material and mental production lies with the bourgeoisie in the capitalist mode of production, the state becomes the repressive machinery of the bourgeoisie.²

Marx (1974), however, maintained that there are exceptions, one example being Louis Bonaparte's regime (1852-1870, he was commonly known as Napoleon III) in France. In a special historical situation where no class had enough power to rule through the state, the state did not function as the direct instrument of any class. Engels holds the same opinion: in all but exceptional situations, the state acts in a fairly uncomplicated way as the direct spokesman and protector of the exploiting class. The state, Engels writes, is "normally the state of the most powerful, economically dominant class, which by its means becomes also the politically dominant class and so acquires new means of holding down and exploiting the oppressed class" (Engels 1975:231). Yet, Engels notes, "exceptional periods occur when the warring classes are so nearly equal in forces that the state power, as apparent mediator, acquires for the moment a certain independence in relation to both" (Engels 1975:231).

Marxists and neo-Marxists subsequently elaborated the concept of the relative autonomy of the state. Authors who have taken part in the debate and significantly contributed to reshaping the Marxist concept of

state include Miliband (1969, 1973), Poulantzas (1973, 1973a, 1975, 1976, 1976a), Anderson (1974), Therborn (1978), Offe (1975), Block (1987), and Skocpol (1985). Non-Marxist scholars like Krasner (1978), Stepan (1978), Trimberger (1978), Hamilton (1982), and Nordlinger (1981) have also examined the question of the state at length. These authors have approached the issue from different perspectives and advanced a number of definitions of “relative autonomy” of the state. They are, however, primarily concerned with developed capitalist states and with formulating abstract theories. Their studies pay little attention to peripheral societies, although Skocpol’s analysis included countries like China. Alavi, in his seminal work on the post-colonial state, underscored the importance of the concept of relative autonomy in peripheral societies. Kohli (1987) and Bardhan (1984) utilized this concept in their studies on India, but in a different manner.

Nevertheless, instead of viewing autonomy as an exceptional situation or aberration, a number of scholars have suggested that the state can possess relative autonomy in a normal situation, and that autonomy is not just a transitional phenomenon as hinted by Marx and Engels. Referring to the tensions and conflicts that arise between the capitalist state and the bourgeoisie, even on a long-term basis, Marxist authors insist that an antagonistic relationship can and does exist between the bourgeoisie and the state. In making this claim, they quite explicitly draw a firm conceptual distinction between power as embodied in the state and power originating in social classes.

Antonio Gramsci first pointed to the distinction between class power and state power. He understood the state in capitalist societies as being essential to maintaining the dominance of the bourgeoisie, securing its long-term interests, and unification. The state, according to Gramsci, embodies two modalities of class domination: the use of force and also the exercise of “hegemony”; that is, the active consent of the ruled. Here, “hegemony” is not simply a matter of installing “false consciousness”; rather, it requires concessions to popular interests and an appeal to “national” objectives that apparently transcend class interests. Carnoy (1984) explains: “Hegemony, in Gramscian terms, meant the ideological predominance of bourgeois values and norms over the subordinate classes” (Carnoy 1984:66). From this interpretation, the question of the state

becomes a primary one in understanding capitalist society. According to Gramsci, “the State is the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains the domination, but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules” (Gramsci 1971:244).

It is necessary, here, to understand that Gramsci does not view the state as merely the coercive machinery of the bourgeoisie. He contends that although the ultimate aim of the state is to ensure the domination of the bourgeoisie, it tends to incorporate the interests of all classes and in doing so sometimes transcends class interests.

The distinction between state power and class power, and the relative autonomy of the state, was further emphasized by Miliband (1973:88):

One of the main reasons for stressing the notion of the relative autonomy of the state is that *there is a basic distinction to be made between class power and state power*, and that the analysis of the meaning and implications of that notion of relative autonomy must indeed focus on the forces which causes it to be greater or lesser, the circumstances in which is exercised, and so on. The blurring of the distinction between class power and state power ... makes any such analysis impossible. (Emphasis added)

It is indeed true that the notion of the relative autonomy of the state discussed so far is primarily conceived in the context of advanced capitalist states, but its importance in understanding the peripheral capitalist state is significant for two reasons. Firstly, it emphasizes the need for a distinction between state power and class power. Secondly, it recognizes that the state does act on its own in many different situations.

A significant shift in the understanding of “state autonomy” has taken place since Peter Evans introduced the concept of “embedded autonomy.” Evans classified Third World states into two categories: predatory and developmental (1995:12) and went on to say that “embedded autonomy is...key to the developmental state’s effectiveness” (Evans 1995:50). He defined embedded autonomy as “Weberian bureaucratic insulation with intense connection to the surrounding social structure” (Evans 1995:50).

For Evans, autonomy means autonomy/independence from “vested interests,” “special interest groups,” “distribution coalition,” and “rent-seekers” who, in more favorable conditions, would be able to influence public policy to their own advantage. He insists that autonomy makes the state capable of constructing long-term projects of social change that transcend the short-term interests of a specific group. However, a state cannot be heavily insulated from the society, hence the need for “embeddedness”—a dense tie with the domestic productive class. This notion of a contradictory combination of embeddedness and autonomy, as Evans’s own study has shown, can only be applied to “developmental” states (e.g., Korea), and has little relevance to “predatory” states (e.g., Zaire). Evans notes “embeddedness is as important as autonomy,” and yet he underscores the significance of embeddedness further, adding “the embeddedness of the developmental state represents something more specific than the fact that the state grows out of its social milieu” (Evans 1995:59). Although the notion of embedded autonomy has drawn a lot of attention, especially in explaining the efficacy of the newly industrialized countries, its usefulness in understanding the complexity of post-colonial states remains questionable on several counts. In societies where the domestic productive class is either absent or weak, the state can gain little from weaving networks of intense connection. Mutual acceptance of different actor’s authority and legitimacy is a necessary condition for embeddedness. But it remains absent in fractious politics and the economies of post-colonial societies. Thus, “autonomy” becomes pivotal and the overriding character of the state.

Evans’s (1995:58) argument that “without autonomy, the embeddedness will degenerate into a super-cartel, aimed, like all cartels, at protecting its members from changes” can be extrapolated further. One can say that where embeddedness cannot be achieved due to the absence of the necessary conditions, the relative autonomy of the state becomes the order of the day.

In this study, “relative autonomy of the state” connotes the autonomous role played by state executives in relation to the social classes of the society, particularly the prominent classes. The definition advanced by Skocpol (1985:9) approximates the situation I will describe as state-autonomy: “states conceived as organizations claiming control over

territories and people may formulate and pursue goals that are not simply reflective of the demands or interests of social groups, classes, or society.” The degree of state-autonomy can vary from single-issue policies that affect a small group to an overall political-economic project that affects the entire dominant/prominent class or classes. In this study, the relative autonomy of the state is conceived in the latter sense.

Framework of Analysis

Equally central to the arguments presented in this book are the concepts of intermediate classes, relative autonomy of the state, hegemony, and the leading premise that the formation and transformation of the state in peripheral societies needs to be understood within the framework of peripheral capitalism, in general, and colonial/post-colonial peripheral capitalism, in particular. Both historical and structural specificities have implications for the society and the social classes, and these specificities influence the capacity of the society and social classes. Here, the explanatory frameworks of Alavi (1973), Kalecki (1976), Thomas (1984), and Ahmad (1985), based upon empirical data gathered in developing countries, become extremely helpful in identifying the determinants of the state form in peripheral societies. Gramsci’s (1971) notion of “hegemony” and “organic crisis” provides the tools to examine the crisis that contributes to the transformation process.

Formation of the State

The nature of the state in peripheral, especially post-colonial, societies is predicated by three factors: the genesis or the historical lineage of state structures, the composition of the classes of that society, and the state’s relationship with the global economic system.

Genesis, Relative Autonomy, and the Centrality of the State

States in the capitalist periphery are imported entities, at least on two counts. First, the material basis upon which they rest is not a product of

indigenous evolution, and secondly, the structures of the state have been (largely) imported through colonial expansion.

There is no denying that capitalism serves as the material basis of states in peripheral societies and that the present form of capitalism has been implanted in the periphery due to Western capitalism's need to expand the geographical sphere and scale of its accumulation. Additionally, historical accounts show that the origins of the state in peripheral societies are either colonial, or, where they are not (for example, Thailand, China, Russia or Turkey), they are engaged in the conscious attempt to modernize based on a European model. Notwithstanding the fact that these states have their own local peculiarities, "they have been 'parachuted' by colonial rule and then taken over, lock, stock, and barrel, i.e. in their territorial claims, administration, and legal structures, by 'independence movements'" (Shanin 1982:315).

The origin of the state effects certain characteristics of the state, for example its potential autonomy. Degnbol-Martinussen has correctly noted "as an overall consequence of the way in which the colonial state was constituted, developed, and transformed into a post-colonial state, the contemporary states of the Third World probably feature a higher degree of relative autonomy vis-à-vis the internal structures and social forces than is typical of the states in the more industrialised countries of the North" (Degnbol-Martinussen n.d). The specific condition for autonomy is determined by the historical specificity and structural uniqueness of a given country. However, there are some general features of peripheral societies that foster its growth. The history of Pakistan, as analyzed by Alavi (1973, 1982), points to three sources of state autonomy in post-colonial societies: the absence of a powerful bourgeois class; the inheritance of the "overdeveloped state"; and the centrality of the state in the economy and society. Alavi argues that "at the time of independence the post-colonial society inherits that overdeveloped apparatus of state and its institutionalized practices through which the operations of indigenous social classes are regulated and controlled," and that the post-colonial state is "equipped with a powerful bureaucratic-military apparatus" (1973:147). Alavi considers the central role of the state in the economy as the "material base" of its autonomy. Alavi's principal argument is that the underdevelopment of

peripheral societies requires the state to be interventionist. As such, the state is given ample opportunity to appropriate economic surplus and to deploy these surpluses in bureaucratically directed activities, which provide the basis of an autonomous role for the executive. Petras (1982:416) and Thomas (1984:67-81) are in agreement with the sources of relative autonomy of the state. Petras contends that the main features of peripheral states include extensive and prolonged intervention in the economy, growing public sector activity, expanding and deepening of external ties, the creation of, and, in varying degrees, the elaboration of planning institutes and mechanisms, and the promotion of industrialization.

Thomas has argued that at least three sources contribute to, or serve as, the sources of the potential autonomy of the state. They are the nonequivalence of state power and the power of the ruling classes; the formation and rapid growth of the bureaucracy leading to the dominance of the executive within the state structure; and the absence of the tradition of “separation of power” among the judicial, executive, and parliamentary organs of the state. One can add two more sources of autonomy: its responsibility for the perpetuation of the capitalist mode of production, and the dependence on external resources or resources owned by the state (e.g., oil). Stallings (1985) argues, “In certain types of Third World countries, it may be possible for the state to obtain a significant amount of autonomy from the domestic ruling class by relying on foreign capital” (261). She insists that “in practice, one kind of foreign capital has been especially important—private bank loans” (261). In certain situations foreign resources coming from international financial institutions like the IMF and the World Bank provide ample opportunity for a state to act in opposition to the immediate interests of the economically dominant classes. Occasionally, peripheral countries are compelled to accept conditions attached to loans, aid, and grants that may adversely affect the economically dominant classes in the short-term. A state relying on external resources can and, indeed, does act as a relatively autonomous entity. The most obvious examples of this are *rentier states*—states that derive most or a substantial part of their revenues from the outside world and whose political system depends, to a large degree, on accruing external revenues that can be classified as rents (Schwarz 2004). The similar behavior patterns of rentier states, whether

they are located in the Middle East (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Iran) or in Africa (e.g., Nigeria, Gabon), demonstrate that these states enjoy similar kinds of autonomy vis-à-vis the social classes.

The centrality of the state in peripheral society, a key source of its autonomy, deserves special mention. The state is central not only in terms of its economic activity (measured by a share of GNP, employment, national investment, consumption, savings etc.) but beyond that to those functions that are essential to the economic process (such as determining and upholding the legal and statutory forms necessary for commodity exchange, stabilizing the growth of national product, determining the choice of development model etc.), and as an agency of hegemony/domination. It is nothing new to say that the capitalist state produces and reproduces capitalist social relations not only at the economic level but also at the political and ideological level. Gramsci (1971:258) reminded us that the capitalist state is the “organizer of [the] consent” in the bourgeois hegemonic system. But in the case of peripheral societies, classes are formed in a distinctly different way compared to advanced capitalist societies and the class formation processes, at times, prevent the emergence of a hegemonic bourgeoisie. Under these circumstances, the state is utilized by the ruling classes, whoever they may be, as the agency of hegemony/domination. And, through it, a new ideology (or value system), assumed to be superior to all others, is imposed. This accords the state apparatus a newer significance and situates it in a position of relative autonomy in relation to the ruling classes.

Thus, owing to their lineage, the state in peripheral societies in general and post-colonial societies in particular, emerges as highly centralized, interventionist, potentially autonomous, and an agency of hegemony and/or domination.

The State and Society

The second predicating factor is the configuration of the society where the state is located. Evans (1995:35), summarizing Robert Bates’s study on Kenya, reminded us that the state should be viewed as “a historically contingent creation” whose properties depend on, among other things, “the

character of the surrounding social structure.” A significant characteristic of the social structure of the peripheral societies is their exceptional class composition. Peripheral societies experienced a massive discontinuity in the processes of indigenous class formation due to the intervention of capitalism from outside, primarily through colonization. In these societies, a dominant class in the classical capitalist sense of control over the means of production often does not exist to any significant extent (Shanin 1982:315). Also absent is the other fundamental class: the proletariat.

In the absence of powerful polar classes, Gramsci (1978:409) argues, “a broad spectrum of intermediate classes stretches between the proletariat and capitalism: classes which seek to carry on the policies of their own.” In the peripheral societies that experienced direct colonial rule, a specific dimension is added to the class structure: the creation of a social stratum primarily dependent upon the state. By virtue of being employed in different state agencies, members of this group serve as intermediaries between the state and the (colonized) masses.

The classes Gramsci refers to as “intermediate classes” are completely different than those described by Marxists as “auxiliary classes.” This is because the intermediate classes, unlike the auxiliary classes, tend to establish their dominance over state apparatuses, as well as other social classes including the proletariat and propertied classes. The structural significance of these classes is not derived from their location vis-à-vis the dominant mode of production, but mostly from their capacity to gain prominence in the political arena. It is indeed true that these classes can be economically dominant at a given point of time. But it is neither a necessary condition nor is it sufficient for them to emerge as the prominent class.

The potential for these classes to capture state power in the post-colonial situation and appear as the ruling class cannot be discounted; rather they should be taken seriously despite the fact that no single class has the ability to take over state power.³ In such circumstances the classes form an alliance and entice support from other social classes. Kalecki (1976) firmly believes that in the absence of a well-developed industrial capitalist class allied with a powerful landlord class, the intermediate classes exercise state power to their advantage. He described such a regime as an “interme-

diate regime.” In their exercise of state power, Kalecki posits, the intermediate classes develop an alliance with the wealthier sections of the peasantry and take on an anti-feudal and anti-imperialist posture.

Thus, class formation processes produce a number of obvious characteristics of the social structure in a peripheral society: (1) though the capitalist mode of production is the dominant mode of production, fundamental polar classes remain absent; (2) classes that may or may not be economically dominant can and do appear as prominent classes; (3) the intermediate classes tend to dominate other social classes including the proletariat and propertied classes; and (4) intermediate classes can capture state power.

The State and the Global Economic System

The relationship between the peripheral state and the capitalist global economy is far less complicated than it appears. Although capitalism in the periphery is distinctly different from advanced capitalism, the material bases of states in peripheral societies rest on capitalism. An interpenetration and hybridization of non-capitalist forms of production, distribution and exchange within the capitalist mode created new modes of production and thus transformed social relations. The new mode of production, although distinct from that of metropolitan capitalism, is capitalist in the ultimate analysis. Of course, it also satisfies the basic structural conditions of the capitalist mode of production (CMP):

- (1) “Free” labor: (a) free of feudal obligations, (b) dispossessed — separation of the producer from the means of production; (2) Economic “coercion” of the dispossessed producer; (3) Separation of economic (class) power from political (state) power; creation of bourgeois state and bourgeois law; (4) Generalized commodity production (production primarily for sale; labor power itself a commodity); (5) Extended reproduction of capital and rise in organic composition of capital. (Alavi 1982:179)

As opposed to the integrated form of generalized commodity production present in metropolitan capitalism, peripheral capitalism expe-

riences a disarticulated form of generalized commodity production. The circuit remains internally incomplete. The realization of this condition occurs only by virtue of the links with the metropolis. The extended reproduction of capital, a crucial condition of the capitalist mode of production, is also fulfilled in a manner different from metropolitan capitalism. The surplus value generated from peripheral capitalist societies leads to the growth of productive power not in the peripheral societies but in the metropolis. Thus, the condition of extended reproduction of capital is met, but without allowing the forces of production of peripheral societies to grow at the pace prevalent in classical capitalism. Thus, the peripheral capitalist state is intrinsically integrated into the global capitalist economy by virtue of its structural nature. This relationship cannot be severed by political rhetoric or half-hearted policy measures.

Although these three structural factors, in combination, play a pivotal role in determining the nature of the state, they are influenced by conjectural developments, including the role of individuals and time. More importantly, none of these factors are fixed. The class composition of any society, for example, is the result of an on-going dynamic process and is bound to change over time. So, too, is the relationship between the different constituents of the state. Furthermore, the demands of the global economy vary according to time and necessity. As a matter of fact, all states undergo continual adaptation. The new demands, whether elicited from social classes or from the global economy, are accommodated through constant non-fundamental modifications. Therefore, at an abstract level, the nature of the state remains open to transformation at any time, and the possibility is always real. But we also observe, at times, a drastic change in the relations of power among the various constituents of the state and in the social role the state plays. This is what we describe as state transformation—change in the nature of the state. But the question is how does the nature of the state change?

Transformation of the State

The transformation of a state, it must be emphasized, is not a short-term phenomenon but a long-term process. However, spectacular events, for

example military coups or popular uprisings, may expedite the process or occur at a critical juncture of the process. But as far as the transformation process is concerned, it occurs when two important factors coalesce. They are: political and economic crises undermining the fundamental undertaking of the state, and the emergence of a counter coalition to replace the ruling regime.

Political and Economic Crises

The crises that contribute to state transformation have their origins in the nature of the post-colonial state and in the class character of the ruling class. However, both of these, in the ultimate analysis, threaten the fundamental undertakings of the state and of the ruling class: the perpetuation of the dominant mode of production and the maintenance of social order necessary for social reproduction.

If one uses the four parameters advanced by Migdal (1988:4) in determining the strength of the state, that is “the capacities to *penetrate* society, *regulate* social relationships, *extract* resources, and *appropriate* or use resources in determined ways” (emphasis in original), one would conclude that the post-colonial state is a strong entity. The capacity of the state to regulate social relationships, for example, is immense. As a matter of fact, the peripheral state is an instrument of class creation. By virtue of its command over the internal and external resources, the state acquires enough strength to produce, transform, and even eliminate social classes (Thomas 1974:87; Farhi 1985:52; Bates 1989). Furthermore, as an interventionist state, it strives to restrict the social life of citizens by using draconian as well as petty means to assure its dominance. It also strives to exercise total control over all economic activities, using many different methods. In the political sphere, it is extremely intolerant of open public discourse and dissenting views. Despite this strong posture, the post-colonial peripheral state is also weak and subject to permanent crises. It is continually beset by political instability, regional disintegration, and the restricted effectiveness of government resources. The political instability of peripheral states is manifested through frequent changes in state forms, in the constitution, and in the interchangeability of political institutions and

personnel. With particular interests being realized via the state, the growth of a state clientele and of corruption leads to its becoming the private preserve and instrument of ever-changing partial interests. This political instability often takes the form of a permanent political crisis (Ziemann and Lanzendorfer 1977).

The economic weakness of the peripheral state arises from the mode of its integration within the world capitalist system. The accumulation based on the realization of surplus value generated from raw materials and by the labor power of the periphery primarily accrues to the advanced industrial countries, while peripheral countries face a shortage of investment funds. The result is that they cannot produce what they need for themselves and, therefore, have to import both commodities and capital. This, in turn, means that price inflation is passed back to them whenever they buy essential foodstuffs, machinery, and oil. In order to purchase imports and pay other rising costs, the peripheral state must find funds in low levels of local accumulation. Subsequently, the peripheral state runs into a variant of the “fiscal crisis of the state.” This forces the peripheral state to borrow from abroad—from governments, international agencies, and private banks. This eventually leads to a “debt trap.” Additionally, the surplus that *can* be realized locally is used to maintain the dominant class and the state apparatuses. All of this adds up to a condition of permanent economic crisis. Thus, the states in most peripheral societies are often weak because of economic crises and yet strong in their capacity to penetrate society and regulate social relationships. Above all, they are in permanent crisis.

These two conflicting, yet perennial, characteristics of the state play a pivotal role in determining the methods of rule. When the intermediate classes appear as the ruling class in a peripheral society, their methods of rule differ dramatically from that of the bourgeoisie in an advanced capitalist society. The former rely more on the state apparatuses than the latter because the intermediate classes emerge as the ruling class not by virtue of their class-power, but rather because they succeeded in capturing state-power. In fact, capturing the state is the best, and perhaps the only, method of becoming the ruling class in peripheral societies. In colonial situations, it is very common that the intermediate classes form an alliance against the

colonial rulers. In their quest for state power, they evolve a counter-hegemonic ideology (most often, nationalism) and bring together other social classes. But the hegemony of the intermediate classes (that arises out of their nationalist project) is limited to the political and ideological leadership and lacks an adequate material basis. Thus, it remains incomplete and fragile, even as it succeeds in capturing state power.

The state possesses traits that play an influential role in determining the methods of rule. Here, one recognizes a paradoxical situation: the classes that apparently capture the state apparatuses are less powerful than the apparatuses themselves. Additionally, the latter have the potential to break free from the dictates of the former. What happens, then, is on the one hand cooperation between the ruling classes and the state apparatuses, while on the other hand there remains a continual confrontation between the regime and the bureaucracy, as one tries to control the other. However, in the long-run there is a progressive attenuation of the power of the ruling class because they rely on the state apparatuses to rule the masses and to augment the power of the bureaucracy in order to control resources. The expansion of the bureaucracy's control over resources takes place through the expansion of the state itself.

The gradual preeminence of the executive is also dependent upon the success or failure of the ruling class to maintain "authority" and contain the political and /or economic crises associated with peripheral societies. The crisis of authority of the ruling class in peripheral societies is directly tied to the rupture of hegemony of the intermediate classes. The rupture can be attributed to three reasons. The first and primary reason for the rupture is erosion in the fundamental basis of the ideological hegemony of the intermediate classes. Nationalism, or a variant of it, becomes the rallying point of the "nation" and suppresses other contradictions (e.g., class conflict, gender discrimination). But the new political realities of post-colonialism can undermine the relevance of an overarching "nationalist" ideology. The second factor is the schism within the ruling alliance. As noted before, the ruling class is an alliance of varied interests. As soon as state power and state resources become available to the members of the alliance, they plunge into internal conflict and contradiction. Members of the alliance begin to vie for power. Thirdly, the organizing consent of the subordinate

masses (i.e., hegemony) is based on the ability of a social group to represent the universal interests of the whole society. Representing universal interests cannot be achieved by ideological inculcation but by the realization of the interests of the subordinate masses “concretely” (Gramsci 1971:182). That is where the ruling class may begin to falter and a hegemonic crisis emerges.

As the ability of the ruling class to organize the consent of the masses weakens, the coercive elements inherent in a hegemonic system are gradually laid bare through the curtailment of fundamental human rights, legislation, the enactment of repressive laws, and, if necessary, through the introduction of a one-party system. The use of police-administrative restraints on freedom, and the administrative manipulation of the electoral and legal processes, and constitutionality in general, becomes commonplace. These undermine the legitimacy and authority of the ruling classes. Because of its inability to obtain the consent of the broad masses, the ruling class fails in its major political undertaking: the perpetuation of the dominant mode of production. This, needless to say, invokes a subsequent economic crisis. This is the situation that Gramsci called an “organic crisis,” a conflict between the represented and the representative, a rift between the popular masses and the ruling class.

A variant of the “fiscal crisis of the state” is rampant in these societies and the state is always dependent upon metropolitan countries and international agencies for support. However, there is a tendency on the part of the ruling intermediate classes in peripheral societies to take a socialist posture. Though their policies do not challenge the larger framework of capital-labor relations and ultimately promote a mixed economy, they sometimes appear to be anti-capitalist. This endeavor is commonly referred to as a “non-capitalist path of development” (Ulanovsky 1969, 1974; Thomas 1974, 1978; Slovo 1974). It attempts to frustrate the development of a large fledgling bourgeoisie, but the conditions of capitalism remain in place and state policies favor the intermediate classes becoming a capitalist class. The socialist posture subjects the state to the pressure of global capitalism and different varieties of sanctions, both overt and covert. This, in conjunction with the structural economic crises of peripheral states, serves as a source of continuous economic crisis. The pursuance of such policies

also impedes the development of the society's productive forces, a necessary condition for the perpetuation of a capitalist economy.

The Counter Coalition

The centrality of the state, the gradual supremacy of the executives, and the rise of a repressive apparatus bring two forces, the bureaucracy and the military, to center stage, and make authoritarianism the dominant mode of articulating power. Democratic pretenses are then discarded and, usually, a one-party state results. If authoritarianism fails to provide a solution to the crises faced by the ruling class and fails to enhance the ability of the state to promote stable and expanded reproduction, or, in other words, to maintain the dominant mode of production, then it is likely that a reorganization of power relations among the constituents of the state will ensue. Thus, the need for a reorganization of "vast state bureaucracies," "organs of political order, i.e. political parties, trade union and other civil organizations," (Gramsci 1971:221) and the capitalist economy as a whole, create conditions conducive to state transformation.

But the transformation can only take place if a counterforce becomes powerful enough to remove the ruling classes. In peripheral capitalist societies, especially when ruled by the intermediate classes, neither the domestic environment nor the global economic logic permit the rise of a single class powerful enough to take on such a task. Therefore, more often than not, a coalition with the bureaucracy and/or military as its key member(s) emerges as an alternative to the ruling class, which seizes power. The counter coalition must also represent a definite social class and have an agenda for change in state policies.

Will these arguments stand? One need not take them at face value, nor should they be discarded at once. The validity of these arguments will be tested when the details of the Bangladesh case are laid out. However, a brief description will be helpful for familiarizing readers with the history of Bangladesh and will provide them with a sketch of the arguments presented in this book.

The Bangladesh Case

One can trace the roots of the Bangladeshi state back to the de-colonization of the Indian subcontinent in 1947 when the departing British colonial power partitioned the country into two nation states: India and Pakistan. Present-day Bangladesh became the eastern province of the newly formed Pakistan separated from the western part by about a thousand miles of Indian territory. The two provinces of this new state, from the outset, had almost nothing in common other than the fact that the majority of the population was Muslim. The social and economic structures of these two wings varied greatly, and culturally they were worlds apart. The differences between the two provinces came to the fore in the early 1950s over the issue of a national language. Despite constituting a numerical majority, Bengalis—the people of the eastern province—were excluded from the power structure dominated by the West Pakistanis, particularly the ethnic Punjabis. In the succeeding years, the disparity between the two wings of the country grew at an alarming rate owing to the transfer of resources from the east, large-scale appropriation of surpluses by the west, and meager developmental expenditure in the east.

The severe economic disparity and obvious political marginalization fomented discontent among the Bengalis. The policies of the Pakistani state also brought changes in the class structure of East Pakistan. In the rural areas, the social structure was differentiated into three classes: the non-cultivating intermediate class of *jotedars* and rich peasants at the apex; followed by self-sufficient peasants in the middle, and the poor peasants, *bargadars* (share-croppers), and landless laborers at the bottom of the hierarchy. In the urban areas, by the 1960s, a class of comprador bourgeoisie had emerged—very small in size but influential in terms of their newly earned wealth and connections with the colonial state. A working class and lumpen proletariat had also come into existence. But the most significant development was the emergence of an array of intermediate classes (i.e., petty traders, shopkeepers, and a salaried class serving the state and private enterprises such as junior officials and clerks, professionals, i.e., doctors and engineers, an intelligentsia involved in different educational and research institutions, and students coming from different strata of society)

who were soon looking for a greater share in the surplus expropriated by the state from the poor peasantry and the massive external aid infused to perpetuate the capitalist system. The collaborationists, the disgruntled sections of the rising Bengali bourgeoisie, and the intermediate classes were searching for ways and means to establish control over the state apparatuses.

Throughout the 1960s, the leaders of the intermediate classes appeared to be the champions of the demands of the Bengali population and used the idioms and icons of “Bengali nationalism” to rally the people around the demand for regional autonomy. By the end of the decade, their efforts to create a counter-hegemonic ideology had succeeded and the most prominent political representative of the intermediate classes, the Awami League, had established its ideological hegemony. The general election of 1970, in which the Awami League won a popular mandate, provided them with constitutional legitimacy. The military-bureaucratic oligarchy and the elite political leadership of Pakistan, two of the principal beneficiaries of the exploitative relationship between the two provinces, not only declined to accept the popular mandate, but also waged a genocidal war against the Bengalis in March 1971. After a nine-month war, the Bengalis emerged victorious and the state of Bangladesh came into existence (see Chapter 1).

At the outset of independence, the emergent Bangladeshi state became an intermediate state in the sense that the state apparatus was captured by an alliance of intermediate classes led by the petty bourgeoisie. The economic policies pursued by the state were directed toward the benefit of the intermediate classes (see Chapter 2). But between 1972 and 1974, executives (primarily bureaucrats) established control over the ruling bloc and began to act somewhat autonomously from the prominent social classes. The struggle between these two contending sources of authority can be described as a conflict between the old state and the new regime. In the final analysis, it was the bureaucrats who succeeded in marginalizing the political regime. The growing bureaucratic control over the state began to shift the balance of power toward the executive. This trend was accompanied by a growing authoritarianism. That is to say the ruling alliance was not only becoming dependent upon the executive branches of the state but also on the coercive apparatus of the state. The drift toward authoritarianism

took place in a very gradual manner as the intermediate classes failed to cope with the multiple sources of crises—rupture of hegemony, political opposition and internal feud, economic disarray, and crisis of authority (see Chapter 3). Faced with an array of crises, the ruling classes responded with efforts to obtain the consent of the masses by devising a new ideology and enforcing discipline through a strengthened repressive apparatus (see Chapter 4). Their responses also included manipulating the electoral process and the constitution, curtailing the freedom of the press, and introducing the one-party system. Meanwhile, there were discernable changes in terms of the state’s relationship with the world economic system. Further integration with the world economic system as a dependent state made Bangladesh more susceptible to external pressure.

However, the final act of the transformation of the Bangladeshi state began when the interests of the new rich class, the bureaucracy, and the military converged and a counter coalition began to emerge in mid-1975. The state transformation took a clearer shape with the promulgation of martial law in 1975, especially with the emergence of General Ziaur Rahman at the helm of power. The state, employing Marx’s (1974:149) words, vowed to “return to its ancient form, the unashamedly simple rule of military sabre and the clerical cowl.” The political and economic projects of the new regime demonstrated the dramatic transformation of the Bangladeshi state (see Chapter 5). Although Ziaur Rahman died in an abortive coup in mid-1981, the process continued during the military regime of General H. M. Ershad between 1982 and 1990. The end of military rule in 1990 paved the way for a democratic beginning for the nation and, perhaps, created opportunities to return to the *raison d’etre* of the Bangladeshi state, but the elected civilian rulers of the country have been content with the state they have inherited. This is because over the previous twenty-one years, the leading political parties have also undergone changes both in terms of ideology and their patrons. The new rich class flourished under the patronage of the state, joined the ranks of the political forces, and has become the principal benefactor of the political parties.

The tale of the transformation of the Bangladeshi state is exciting in its own right but can the analysis provide us with conceptual tools to understand states in other post-colonial peripheral societies? The particularity of the Bangladeshi experience notwithstanding, it is my contention that the

framework herein used for analyzing the formation and the transformation of the Bangladeshi state is equally valid for others; Tanzania is a case in point (see Chapter 6). The construction of nationhood under British colonial domination, the emergence of middle class prominence, the consolidation of their interests under the leadership of Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), the promulgation of the socialistic ideals in the Arusha declaration (1967), and the collapse of the intermediate state under the weight of crises and international pressure in the 1990s demonstrate a similar trajectory and can be analyzed with the proposed framework.

NOTES

- 1 Most of Gramsci's essays and notes are written between 1916 and 1935. But English translations were not available until *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* was published in 1971. For the purpose of this study four volumes of Gramsci's writings were consulted: *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, *Selections from Political Writings (1910-1920)*, *Selections from Political Writings (1921-1926)*, and *Selections from Cultural Writings*.
- 2 Marx, in his *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (Marx 1968:182) writes, "Legal relations as well as forms of the state are to be grasped neither from themselves nor from the so-called general development of the human mind, but rather have their roots in their material conditions of life... The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of the society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general."
- 3 The term "capture" refers to a phenomenon different from having influence over the state power. The capture implies that specific groups have total control over the policy process. It undermines a transparent and legitimate democratic policy process and reduces the access of rival interests to the state.