

I n t r o d u c t i o n

COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON ETHNICITY AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS

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Twenty years ago I had the privilege of being the guest editor for a special issue of the *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, devoted to “The Global Crisis: Sociological Analyses and Responses” (1984, Volume 25, Nos. 1–2). In retrospect, although the East–West confrontation is no longer present, several global problems noted in the issue are still very much with us, foremost among these being, in a different form perhaps, North–South relations. Thus, I noted at the time:

The global crisis reflects a crisis in the hegemony of the formal and substantive aspects of the post war “pax americana” [America’s] paramount remedy to social ills seems to be a myopic but massive military response, in Central America as in the Middle East as in Southeast Asia. (Tiryakian 1984: 125–27)

On the whole, there is much in that issue that remains relevant for a macroscopic view of our situation in this still formative period of the new century. However, two decades later, there are new observations to be made, new

themes that have been raised that should be analyzed on a comparative basis, and new multidisciplinary approaches to be proposed.

Our world of advanced modernity is prone to serious risks; risks that often are unforeseen consequences of purposive action in one sector which trigger negative reaction in another sector. The risks are environmental (Beck 1999), economic (such as the rogue trader in distant Singapore whose speculative trading brought the collapse in 1995 of an old British banking institution, Baring Bank), and political. Regarding the political risks, for example, twenty years ago American foreign policy found it expedient to arm Hussein's Iraq in its war against Iran and to provide training to the Taliban in Afghanistan in their struggle against Soviet dominance. Both turned out to be very bad investments for the United States.

Twenty years ago the concept of "globalization" was not current, but despite the then too facile polarization of the world into two superpowers—the "Free world" and the "Soviet world"—there was growing recognition of increasing interdependence and, consequently, of the growing vulnerability (risk) of the world to events in one region having significant ramifications elsewhere. The initial hardline of the Reagan administration toward the "evil empire" and the deployment of missiles in Germany increased the threat of a global conflict across national and even regional borders. And then, almost miraculously for a secular age, new leadership in the Soviet world seeking to reform outdated economic structures instead led unwittingly to the astonishing implosion of a total societal system that had been seen at the beginning of the decade as a monolith of hierarchical power. The "global crisis" had passed, at least in part.

But crisis reemerged in the decade of the 1990s, in several forms. AIDS, unknown at the start of the 1980s, has become one of the great scourges of human medical history and is still raging in sub-Saharan Africa. It has attracted, of course, enormous attention and vast resources have been spent in seeking remedies, vaccines, and informed scientific knowledge to neutralize the virus.

Another sort of virus, which may have been dormant in premodern times, seems to have come out of the night soil in many parts of the world with a vengeance in the last century. Although it has many strains, the virus in question is manifest in severe protracted conflicts and violence between racial and ethnic groups that traditionally live or have lived *within* a given

territory, even in situations where the two groups were not strictly exogamous. The most virulent form of the virus took the form of genocide, with the most notorious examples being the genocide of Armenians in the dying days of the Ottoman Empire and the genocide of Jews in the dying days of the Third Reich. Although the world's democracies could join the chorus of those demanding "never again!", the second half of the twentieth century was marked by both the sharp decline of *interstate* violent conflict *and* the wide spread of severe *intrastate* strife, tensions and alienation from existing institutional arrangements, ethnic mobilization and contestation, spilling into violence and civil wars. Echoing earlier forms of genocide, the 1990s witnessed in Rwanda (Central Africa) the near genocide of 800,000 Tutsis at the hands (and machetes) of Hutus. That slaughter failed to generate mediation and intervention, unlike the "ethnic cleansing" and civil wars in the disintegration of Yugoslavia—perhaps because of the latter's closer ties with Europe and the United States.¹ Other countries in West Africa—Liberia, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, among others—were also scenes of prolonged violence and deadly ethnic conflicts (Horowitz 2001), much like the situations in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka.

At the same time, there have been "good surprises" in settings marked by ethnic divisions with previous potential, or actual, conflicts. There are areas where experts anticipated "more of the same" in the way of violence and where violence did not occur and/or where a peace process began. Much of East Europe comprised of large ethnic minorities—the Baltic states of Estonia and Latvia with a large Russian-speaking population, Slovakia and Rumania with a large Hungarian minority—has been spared the ethnic violence that many had anticipated after the breakup of Soviet hegemony. More spectacular, perhaps, there was in the last decade in at least three places unexpected peace accords between bitter foes: in Northern Ireland the "Good Friday" accord in 1998; in South Africa the deKlerk–Mandela negotiations in 1993–94 leading to the peaceful transfer of power from the White minority to the Black majority; and also in 1993–94 the Rabin–Arafat accords providing a plan for the cessation of Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

Ten years later, the variables making for protracted conflict along ethnic and racial lines, and the variables making for conflict resolution (short-term and long-term) and the interaction between such variables are

still elusive, though we have substantially increased the data base of observations taken from contemporary and historical sources. The short-lived optimism at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s that the end of superpower conflict would inaugurate a “new world order” was fueled by the promise and premise of economic “globalization.” Enthusiasts for free trade and deregulation believed that the breakdown of economic barriers and the privatization of major sectors of the economy would encourage and enhance the interdependence of countries and facilitate the development of peripheral regions. This would cut down on the material bases of ethnic competition, which can at times escalate to civil wars.² This optimistic vision of the benefits of global economic expansion replacing global violence and war is a retake of the nineteenth century. People believed, and many still do, that economic globalization would improve the material lot of mankind, even if there are marked inequalities in the improvement.

However, in addition to the anti-globalization movements that have sprung up, at least since the 1999 Seattle anti-WTO demonstrations, a more profound shock wave against global integration was generated with the September 11, 2001 attack on New York and Washington. The ethnoreligious dimension of the motivation—a radical Arabo-Islamic response to the perception of their homeland being occupied or under the domination of “infidels” (Israeli and Americans) aided by their satraps in the Middle East—in turn led to draconian American and allied retaliation against the perceived base of the Al Qaeda attackers and their host society, Taliban-ruled Afghanistan.

The ethnic kaleidoscope of the entire region has generated ethnic strife and tensions across borders in South and Southeast Asia, augmented by regimes seeking to curb, repress, or polish off long-standing secessionist movements having an ethnic dimension. The Middle East has become even more prone to ethnoreligious violence with Bush’s American war in Iraq and a new, hard-line policy by Israel’s Sharon inciting chain reactions of terrorism against civilian and military targets of all nationalities, targets that are no longer confined to war zones. In a tragic sense, globalization has taken on a new dimension: the globalization of terrorism and anti-terrorism. It is, *de facto*, World War III, very different from the two global wars of the

last century, which were wars of states and coalitions of states against other such coalitions.

It is critical in this present environment of global crisis, more socio-political than socioeconomic, albeit having economic consequences (e.g. record high prices for oil which are detrimental for world development), to attend to the factors that both generate and also alleviate or remedy the protracted ethnic violence so much in evidence in the world. This, then, is the background rationale for this special issue.

An important background stimulus for the planning of this issue stems from an initiative of the Fulbright Commission undertaken by the Executive Director of the Council for International Exchange of Scholars, Dr Patti Peterson. The initiative assembled a team of scholars known as *New Century Scholars* (with myself a project director) to do collaborative and individual work on a global problem in the course of a year. In 2003, a multidisciplinary team of thirty scholars, ten from the United States and twenty from overseas, were selected as Fulbright fellows to collaborate on the theme *Addressing Sectarian, Ethnic, and Cultural Conflict within and across National Borders*. Twenty countries outside the United States were represented, with a wide geographical sweep from the United Kingdom to Latvia to Nepal and China. In addition to continuous online communication, the team as a whole met on three occasions: at a conference center in New York state in February, in Belfast (Northern Ireland) in June, and lastly a week-long meeting at a conference center in Maryland with a closing plenary session at the US Institute of Peace in Washington, in December. Details about the team and its activities are available online (http://www.cies.org/NCS/NCS_II.htm).

Although no “magic bullets” were discovered, the work of the team as a whole and its three sub-groups brought to the fore salient issues and conceptualizations, which were subjected to close scrutiny in group discussions. At the initial orientation meeting laying out a program for the year, it became immediately apparent that several members had research experience in various settings where a peace accord and a cessation of hostilities had taken place. What was important was the recognition that a peace accord, whether from within or imposed from without, is not a dramatic endpoint. It is part of a continuing process. After an accord is entered into, it may either abet further progress in reducing the sources of the conflict or

it may, unwittingly, rekindle the factors making for violent conflicts. So, for example, if “humanitarian assistance” from the outside is given to the elites involved in the violence, rather than being distributed fairly among all the victims of the violence, this can encourage the elites to maintain or resume positions that initiated the violence in the first place.

The NCS team recognized three major components that are *interrelated* in situations of conflict: (a) factors making for severe ethnic conflicts, (b) factors and mechanisms involved in peace processes, and (c) the dynamics of collective identity. The last of this set is comprised of cultural and social psychological dimensions, which may fuel conflicts when elites seek to mobilize a group against the “Other” by invoking a collective identity of the past. But the peace process may also be generative of new, more inclusive collective identities.

The NCS team took on a division of labor with the formation of three subgroups: one focusing on a comparative examination of ethnic conflicts and the salient theories accounting for these, one on matters of identity, and one on peace processes. At present, several groups are seeking to further develop their collaborative work and are planning volumes for publication. The items in the present special issue include some of the contributors who were fellows in the NCS 2003 initiative, with others outside the team recruited to provide complementary perspectives.

John Rex, who has stimulated a great deal of comparative research on racial and ethnic conflict over the course of several decades, begins by providing a broad global canvas in “Empire, Race, and Ethnicity.” Efforts at conceptualizing the race and ethnic relations as cardinal features of the past 60 years have to be set in a context of the collapse of old imperial orders, four world wars (the fourth being the present American War against Terror), and the collapse of Communism. Rex brings into the discussion the rise and decline of the Welfare state and the influential thought of British sociologist T.H. Marshall regarding social equality and citizenship identity. Marshall had not foreseen the influx in Europe of non-Western minorities, in the wake of the collapsed traditional empires, forming distinct cultural communities and giving rise to controversies regarding multiculturalism and rights of citizenship. After considering various situations of tension and conflict as well as endeavors at reconciliation and integration in “post colonial society,”³ John Rex devotes considerable attention to the United

States, whose actions, with its allies overseas, particularly (but not solely) in the war against terrorism, has had and continues to have a significant impact on ethnic relations and immigration in various parts of the world, not just in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Steve Fenton, a British sociologist specializing in ethnic studies, complements John Rex's contribution by raising fundamental questions about the elephant (or, perhaps, gorilla) that is "ethnic conflict." In "Beyond Ethnicity: The Global Comparative Analysis of Ethnic Conflict," Fenton argues for the need of a global comparative analysis to understand why some boundaries between ethnic groups become ones of serious conflict while others do not. He rejects the essentialist argument that there is a one-to-one correlation of ethnicity and culture, an intrinsic "ethnicity" given by its culture, which is at the heart of ethnic conflicts. Fenton proposes that ethnic identities are not fixed but have to be situated in a broader context of state and imperial systems. He illustrates this with wide-ranging examples that show the variability or contingency of ethnic mobilization as a *response* (not as a primary cause) to the destabilization or crises of nation-states. The case of Malaysia as a post-colonial state is particularly informative of the decreasing salience of ethnicity as modernization and globalization introduce new moral and cultural debates within the Malay community.

The theoretical import of Fenton's comparative analysis is to "decouple" culture and ethnicity and to challenge a view that we are in an "age of ethnicity" where ethnic allegiance is key for a sociological accounting of contemporary social organization and social formation. Saying this does not obviate, Fenton concludes, the reality that minorities are at risk when state systems break down; if states fail, there is need for larger entities at the regional or global level to intervene to protect ethnic and other minorities at risk.

Political scientist Pierre du Toit draws upon his in-depth knowledge of South Africa—widely recognized as a "success story" of the past ten years in the transition to a multiethnic democracy whereas two decades ago external observers viewed the country as ripe for bitter racial/ethnic wars—to provide a case study analysis of broad comparative issues involving collective identity in post-conflict peace settlements. Thus, "'Parity of Esteem': A Conceptual Framework for Assessing Peace Processes, With a

South African Case Study” offers a window to one major component of the total dynamic process that has provided a frame for the NCS 2003 team, and for this issue. Ethnic conflict and conflict resolution are not binary opposites but are interrelated, dialectically, one might even add. The cessation of protracted violence in peace accords is very fragile and subject to breakdowns, as the case of the Rabin–Arafat peace accord demonstrates, with echoes in Sri Lanka and the Philippines.

What then, asks du Toit, are the critical factors to be confronted in a durable settlement? Drawing on social identity theory, he introduces important but often overlooked social psychological factors and issues involving *relative group status*. Newly adopted constitutional rules, say those involving access to labor markets previously dominated by one group, are essential aspects of negotiated peacemaking by opening up competition. The negotiated peace accord should not only enhance the self-esteem of both parties as a “win-win” result, but also must provide for parity of outcomes in the ensuing competition for resources. *Parity of outcomes* is achieved when the competitive process is judged by all parties in terms of overall fairness, i.e. the willingness of the “loser” in one round to reenter the game in another round. The complementary social psychological aspect is *parity of esteem*, when winners do not seek to degrade, humiliate, or taunt their competitors.

Du Toit provides the reader with rich materials of South Africa and legislations since 1994 seeking redress from a historical legacy of inequality. Examining at length the Employment Equity Act, he concludes that distributive policies show signs of polarizing stakeholders by inducing “invidious evaluations based on race from both parties.” This undermines the parity of esteem and, with further polarization, could threaten the status of the negotiated constitutional rules.

The implosion of Communist states west of the Ural in the past fifteen years has generated many “new” multiethnic states that have severely tested the Soviet ideology of advanced socialism producing a “new man,” with social equality trumping pre-Communist bases of social differentiation such as class and ethnicity. Despite the ideology, the Soviet States had privileged cadres in terms of party office holders. Russian and Russian-speaking minorities were, in various “autonomous republics,” high status immigrants that dominated the indigenous population. Given this contra-

diction, the end of the Soviet regime was susceptible to political instability and upheavals from the “periphery” directed at the “center.” The disintegration of Tito’s craftily organized Yugoslavia was marked with varying degrees of violence: at the start of the 1990s, ethnically homogeneous Slovenia left the federation after a brief military contestation with Belgrade; and the Republic of Macedonia (FYRM), though burdened with an Albanian ethnic minority, did the same, without opposition from the official Yugoslav government in Belgrade. However, the remainder of the decade saw a series of brutal wars involving territorial and ethnic components of the former Yugoslav federation. And the powder keg of violent ethnic conflicts between and within former Communist states blew up in the trans-Caucasus in the case of ethnic separatism in Georgia, and the Armenian enclave of Karabagh in Azerbaijan. The ethnic differentiation and cleavages, generating more differentiation than social integration, has had similar “fault lines” in two of the Baltic states and in Central Asia in the “stan” states (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkistan, Kazakhstan, etc.).

What are the factors, endogenous and exogenous, which produce overt conflict and what are the factors that mute these and may permit a new national identity to replace that of the ideal of the “soviet classless society”? In “The Impact of National Identity on Conflict Behavior: Comparative Analysis of Two Ethnic Minorities in Crimea,” Karyna Korostelina, a social psychologist, makes use of survey research analysis to provide insights to these considerations through the use of data from a cross-sectional analysis of two significant minority groups, Russians and Tatars, who cohabit in one region of the Ukraine. The Crimean Peninsula has had a troubled past and has been a zone of conflicting civilizations (recall the savage multinational Crimean War of the 1850s). Once a part of the Ottoman Empire, then annexed to Russia, briefly an autonomous republic after World War I and, lastly, in a shuffle typical of colonial empires, turned over to the Ukrainian SSR, it emerged fully independent after 1991 in the flotsam and jetsam of the USSR.

Korostelina extends du Toit’s emphasis on subjective, attitudinal factors involved in identity issues that satisfy important needs, such as self-esteem. Given that historically Russians and Tatars have had tense rather than amicable relations, how do their ethnic identities and their material situation as minority groups (albeit Russians being six times as numerous

in Crimea as Tatars) relate to their view of each other and how does a broader Ukrainian identity moderate or mediate each group's perception of the other? Korostelina indicates that the broader question of her study is that nation-building in the new post-Communist states carries a two-edged sword: a shared national identity could provide for conflict resolution by being perceived, on the one hand, to provide new opportunities for economic independence, human dignity, and self-esteem; or, on the other, may be perceived as adding to economic deprivation and minority grievances, and a greater readiness for conflict.

Her underlying research hypothesis treats the impact of features of (Ukrainian) national identity formation as intervening variables on an individual's or group's readiness for conflict or accommodation. In the case of Russians, a salient ethnic identity and satisfaction with national identity *strengthen* individual and group conflict tendencies, but when level of adoption of (Ukrainian) national culture is high, salient ethnic identity produces lesser readiness for conflict behavior. In the case of Tatars, salient national identity and adopted Ukrainian culture *weaken* the influence of ethnic identity on readiness to fight other ethnic groups. Korostelina provides further analysis of differentials between the two groups as a function of perceived economic deprivation, ethnocentrism, and perceived majority/minority position. Her rich textured discussion suggests that adopting a national identity may mean different things and have different consequences for different ethnic groups, depending upon several variables, including degree of ethnocentrism. Preferential treatment of a given minority by the state may increase the readiness for conflict behavior.

In brief, the analysis of ethnicity in Crimea complements the discussion in the previous paper based on South Africa regarding the importance of parity of outcome and parity of esteem in the forging of a new national identity in areas with salient ethnic identities. They are indicative of the contingency of peace between ethnic groups where there has been regime change that impacts the relative social status of each group.

A comparative study of ethnic status reversal and the centrality of the official language issue is the foundation for Carol Schmid, Brigita Zepa, and Arta Snipe's collaborative study "Language Policy and Ethnic Tensions in Quebec and Latvia." Quebec and Latvia have had quite different political pasts. Quebec is a part of the Canadian federation while Latvia is now,

again, an independent republic. However, the dominant ethnic group in each region, today, feels its continued existence depends, in part, on the maintenance of its language as the official language of its territory. Hence, the critical variable is the formulation of a new language policy intended to promote the national identity and language aspirations of an indigenous population that was of a minority status in its own country until it came into power. With regime change and without overt violence, the indigenous population has become the politically dominant *ethnie*, while the former majority group is now a political minority.

In both Quebec and Latvia, nationalist movements of independence two decades apart privileged language (French and Latvian respectively) as a vehicle of autonomy from the dominance of the language of the “other” (English and Russian respectively). When the independent-minded Parti Quebecois (PQ) swept into office in 1976, it introduced sweeping new legislation of a social democrat nature and part and parcel of the reform program were what became popularly known as Bill 22 and Bill 101. These were intended to make French the privileged official language of Quebec in the public and the private sector. This legislation, the authors indicate, has been bitterly contested by the English minority (which is the majority outside of Quebec) that has invoked the broader bilingual frame of Canada to protect its linguistic stake.

Schmid et al. explore how the restrictive Quebec legislation happened to become a model for Latvia in 1988, with an important link being the demographic anxiety of Quebecois and Latvian nationalists of being submerged by dint of immigration and falling birth rates. In the Soviet period, large numbers of ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking minorities came to Latvia and have remained as permanent residents. As the authors explain, “asymmetrical bilingualism” worked in their favor as long as the state was Moscow-controlled. With the new restrictive language policy, immigrant Russians seeking Latvian citizenship will have to pass a language test. This restriction is bitterly resisted though the Russians in Latvia do not have the same recourse as the English in Quebec who can appeal to federal legislation for the protection of its language.

The authors include in their analysis a comparative assessment of how successful the new language policy has been, especially regarding

school attendance, while taking into account how it has generated a new dimension to ethnic tensions in Quebec and Latvia. The matter, they clearly indicate, is not closed—neither in these two countries nor in others where some form of “asymmetrical bilingualism” has been prevalent.

Lynn Hempel combines sophisticated statistical techniques with survey data gathered from her field research in a polyethnic society, Mauritius, to develop a powerful critique of a major perspective and its variants on ethnic identity. “Instrumentalism” views ethnic identity and the process of ethnic mobilization as based on individuals maximizing their material interests. Hence, the title of Hempel’s communication is “What’s It Worth to You? The Questionable Value of Instrumentalist Approaches to Ethnic Identification.” Very similar to, if not derived from, rational choice theory, the instrumentalist perspective (and its variants discussed by Hempel), while a corrective to earlier perspectives that see ethnic and nationalist attachments as negative, irrational, atavistic aspects of modernity, rests on certain core assumptions. Instrumental approaches posit that groups, like individuals, view their ethnic membership as causally related to their material interests, for instance, in terms of the benefits or economic resources they receive, rather than on more subjective factors of sentiments and experiences. In this perspective, Hempel notes, the more individuals perceive economic advantages to ethnic group membership, the more they will identify with that ethnic group. But is this critical assumption, which underlies many recent theoretical approaches to studies of ethnic processes, borne out?

The Indian Ocean island of Mauritius, off the African coast, is an apt site for a comparative study of ethnic identity. Although it has no indigenous population, its manifold ethnic distinctions that historically arrived from Asia, Africa, and, to a limited extent, Europe, during an era of plantation-colonialism are recognized as the “underlying premise for all social classifications.” Hempel discusses the six major ethnic groups of Mauritius, with its division of labor that occupationally cut across ethnic boundaries, reflecting the increasing employment opportunities in the successful transition of Mauritius from a monocrop sugar crop production economy into a more diversified economy (e.g. textile manufacturing and tourism).

Though it has been more successful than most post-colonial, primary sector societies in raising the standard of living and avoiding bitter ethnic

clashes, Mauritius does possess ethnic tension, as Hempel notes. Creoles of African or mixed African descent (28 percent of the population) feel a growing resentment at being worse off economically than all other ethnic groups. Hindus (40 percent of the population) have a higher socioeconomic status and yet both perceive themselves and are perceived by others as being at or near the top of the socioeconomic structure.

Hempel's detailed statistical analysis establishes some basis for instrumentalism: the strength of an individual's identification with an ethnic group does vary with his/her perception of the group identity as being instrumental for accessing economic goods. But, she adds, this provides a rather limited account of identification, and there are important group differences, with economic instrumentalism affecting ethnic identification among Creoles to a greater extent than it does for Hindus. Her analysis leads her to argue that prevalent instrumentalist assumptions require a reconceptualization that would take into account the influence of cultural systems. Thus, economic instrumentalism may form "a constitutive aspect of ethnic culture," rather than be an objective, exogenous force in ethnic identification. From this, she concludes that there is a need for additional comparative ethnographic research on the bearing of the moderating effects of cultural systems on the relationship between interests and ethnic identification.

David Brown, an Australian comparative political scientist, offers a related critique of instrumentalism. "Why Independence? The Instrumental and Ideological Dimensions of Nationalism" is an analysis of the ethnic unrest and separatist movement in another part of the Indian Ocean, Aceh, Northern Sumatra, which after Dutch rule became part of Indonesia. Brown provides the historical background of the bitter conflicts between the Jakarta government and the autonomist-minded Aceh, with an evolution of the conflict from the Acehnese seeking regional autonomy to making a goal of independence. Although some of the regional conflicts in Indonesia have had a sectarian dimension (Muslims versus Christians), this is not the case with the Acehnese who are Muslim like the great majority of Indonesians. This has not made state repression lighter. Aceh was recently under martial law and for the past fifteen years has been subject to military intervention interspersed with failed attempts at the peace process (a situation that bears comparison with other settings in Southeast Asia, such as the Philippines and Sri Lanka).

Brown examines previous accounts of the protracted Acehese conflict and finds they conflate the struggle over material interests *and* ideological, moralistic rhetoric. He seeks to analytically separate the motivation of actors: rational self-interest legitimated by moral absolutes or ideological commitment, which then shape the perceptions of interest. In Weberian terms, it might be said, we should analytically differentiate explanations of the conflict between *Zweckrationalität* and *Wertrationalität*, instrumental rationality and the rationality of absolute ends.

In developing his critique of instrumental approaches to the Aceh setting, Brown echoes John Rex's initial paper in presenting a broad canvas of the ethnic minority movements ("ethnonationalism" as termed in the literature) that have had an upsurge in the past half-century. And (as noted by Hempel in her review of the literature) an important mode of explanation has been to view ethnic consciousness and mobilization as a shield for underlying economic and political interests effected by changing economic and political conditions. Thus, in the case of Aceh, nationalism was spurred by the discovery of rich oil deposits, a situation akin to the discovery of North Sea oil deposits that invigorated Scottish nationalism in the 1970s. The instrumentalist approach purports to account not only for Aceh secessionism but also for the emergence of ethnic rivalries and various manifestations of ethnic nationalism, inside and outside Indonesia. What fuels these conflicts is the differential and preferential treatment of state patronage outside the state heartland (in this case, Java), with ensuing calls for ethnic autonomy being, in effect, "bargaining demands for increased state patronage." Acehese rebellion, in this perspective, may thus ultimately be viewed as an armed rejection of what has been commonly termed "internal colonialism" (the domination by the state over a peripheral constituent of the state where there is no constitutional provision for such dominance).

Brown's analysis of the dynamics of the ethnic conflict points to the breakdown of trust and legitimacy in Aceh regarding Jakarta after the unseating of Suharto's regime (1967–98) in student rioting. The post-Suharto regime, rather than seeking integration of various ethnic and regional components of Indonesia, has seemingly reverted to traditional patrimonial networks with state cronyism and corruption prevalent. This has given rise to a moral distancing in Aceh, a perception of a "moral Us and the immoral Other," and that distancing, Brown argues, is a causal factor in

the political conflict not reducible to instrumentalism. More broadly part of the picture, he argues, is the impact of globalization as accentuating the disruption of Aceh society begun in an earlier wave of modernization.

Nationalism offers a new ideological base, beyond Islam, for establishing legitimate authority in a situation of mass anomie, an endeavor to reestablish community by utilizing, in part, ethnic myths of an idealized past.

David Brown's nuanced analysis of Aceh nationalism complements Hempel's discussion of the variability of ethnic identity. Different actors in Aceh nationalism embrace it for different reasons, some for pragmatic interest calculations, some on the basis of absolutist ideologies. The demand for Aceh independence stemming from Aceh nationalism voices demands of ethnic nationalism but also of civic nationalism, the latter seeking an ideological vision of a liberal civic Aceh, replacing the short-lived vision of a liberal-individualist civic Indonesia.

Aceh nationalism, today, as an affirmation of one people with a common will thus embodies two general orientations, a pragmatic and an ideological one. It also embodies, Brown concludes, a mix of an ethnic vision and of a civic vision; these visions are interconnected and are utilized by political elites for both home and abroad legitimation. The reader can find in this comparative case study materials that are of relevance in approaching various other settings of the world where severe conflicts, peace processes, and questions of national identity intertwine.

NOTES

- 1 Despite ambivalence in much of Europe, the United States-led NATO waged a successful 100-day war against Serbian attempts at Albanian "ethnic cleansing" in the province of Kosovo in 1999. The resulting "ethnic cleansing" of Serbs in Kosovo has led to a precarious *modus vivendi* between the majority Muslim Albanians and the remaining minority Orthodox Serbs under the watchful eyes of the United Nations mandate (UNMIK) and NATO military command (KFOR).

Tragically, another benign neglect of African genocides seems to be taking place, this time in Darfur, Western Sudan, where

the Islamic government of Khartoum is waging “a scorched earth, near-genocidal war against its own citizens” (Bonino and Shawcross 2004; see also Wallis 2004).

- 2 For a broad recent discussion of factors making for ethnic violence and civil wars in low-income countries and how these may be mitigated by non-violent external intervention, see the comprehensive World Bank study (Collier 2003). See, also, the complementary work of Doyle and Sambanis (forthcoming) focusing on the United Nations in dealing with the destabilization of ethnically plural “anocracies”: weak states that “are neither democratic enough to reduce grievance nor autocratic enough to suppress the early stages of organization for rebellion” (Doyle and Sambanis forthcoming).
- 3 Of related interest is A.G. Hopkins’ important volume, which provides much comparative historical materials on “modern globalization” and “post-colonial globalization” (Hopkins 2002). The various contemporary ethnic identity and ethnic conflict situations treated in this special issue of IJCS may be viewed as features of post-colonial globalization.

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